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PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE LAW REQUIRING
DETAILED DISCLOSURE FROM Low-ECHELON EMPLOYEES
NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554 (2d Cir. 1983).
In Barry v. City of New York,1 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
expanded the permissible scope of public employee disclosure statutes
by holding that New York City's financial disclosure law,2 which re-
quires detailed disclosure from low echelon employees, 3 does not vio-
late their constitutional right to privacy.
Local Law 48 is a comprehensive ordinance covering elected and ap-
pointed officials, as well as civil service employees whose annual salary
exceeds $30,000.1 The ordinance requires these employees and their
spouses to make a detailed annual disclosure of their income, assets,
and liabilities.6 Information disclosed pursuant to Local Law 48 be-
1. 712 F.2d 1554 (2d Cir. 1983).
2. NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 1106-5.0 (1975), amended by Local
Law 48 (1979) [hereinafter referred to as Local Law 48].
3. See infra note 6. The district court case, Slevin v. City of New York, 551 F. Supp. 917
(S.D.N.Y. 1982), consolidated two class actions for trial on the merits. In the first, Slevin v. City
of New York, No. 79 Civ. 4524, the plaintiff class consisted of Fire Department battalion chiefs,
deputy chiefs, medical officers, and their spouses. In the second, Barry v. City of New York, No.
79 Civ. 4627, the plaintiff class consisted of New York City Police Department captains, deputy
chiefs, inspectors, deputy inspectors, lieutenants, police surgeons, and their spouses. Both groups
of employees represent uniformed city civil service employees earning over thirty thousand dollars
annually.
4. Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d at 1564. The Barry plaintiffs claimed that the ordi-
nance violated their first amendment rights of free speech and association, their fourth amend-
ment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizure, their fifth amendment right against
self-incrimination, and their ninth and fourteenth amendment rights to privacy. Slevin v. City of
New York, 551 F. Supp. 917, 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). The district court concluded that only the
fourteenth amendment argument presented a viable claim. Id. at 931.
5. Local Law 48 applies to the following persons: (1) The Mayor, City Council President,
City Councilman, and Borough Presidents. (2) Candidates for such positions. (3) Each head of
an administration, each deputy administrator, assistant administrator, each agency head, deputy
agency head, and member of any board or commission, other than a member of a board or com-
mission who serves without compensation. (4) Each city employee who is a member of the man-
agement pay plan, or whose salary is thirty thousand dollars a year or more. NEW YORK CITY,
N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 1106-5.0(a) (1979).
6. The ordinance requires disclosure of the following information:
1. List the name, address and type of practice of any professional organization in
which the person reporting or his spouse, is an officer, director, partner, proprietor or
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comes public record7 unless, on the basis of a privacy claim filed by the
employee, the information is exempted from public disclosure.8 If an
employee, or serves in any advisory capacity, from which income of one thousand dol-
lars or more was derived during the preceding calendar year.
2. List the source of each of the following items received or accrued during the pre-
ceding calendar year by the person reporting or his spouse.
(a) any income for services rendered, other than any source of income otherwise
disclosed pursuant to paragraph one, of one thousand dollars or more;
(b) any capital gain from a single source of one thousand dollars or more other
than from the sale of a residence occupied by the person reporting;
(c) reimbursement for expenditures of one thousand dollars or more in each
instance;
(d) honoraria from a single source in the aggregate amount of five hundred dollars
or more;
(e) any gift in the aggregate amount of value of five hundred dollars or more from
any single source received during the preceding year, except as otherwise provided
under the election law covering campaign contributions.
3. List each creditor to whom the person reporting or his spouse was indebted for a
period of ninety consecutive days or more during the preceding calendar year in an
amount of five thousand dollars or more.
4. List the identity of each investment and each parcel of real property in which the
value of twenty thousand dollars or more was held by the person reporting or his spouse
at any time during the preceding calendar year, based on the cost thereof or when ac-
quired by means other than purchase, an estimate of the value at the time of receipt.
5. List the identity of each trust or other fiduciary relationship in which the person
reporting or his spouse held a beneficial interest having a value of twenty thousand dol-
lars or more during the preceding calendar year.
6. (a) Indicate if the total amount of income received from each and every source
listed (1) pursuant to the provisions of paragraph one and subparagraphs a, b and c of
paragraph two of this section is at least one thousand dollars but less than five thousand
dollars, at least five thousand dollars but less than twenty-five thousand dollars; at least
twenty-five thousand dollars but less than one hundred thousand dollars or one hundred
thousand dollars or more; and (2) pursuant to the provisions of subparagraphs d and e of
paragraph two of this section is less than one thousand dollars; at least one thousand
dollars but less than five thousand dollars; at least five thousand dollars but less than
twenty-five thousand dollars; at least twenty-five thousand dollars but less than one hun-
dred thousand dollars or one hundred thousand dollars or more.
(b) Indicate if the total amount of indebtedness owed each creditor listed pursuant to
paragraph three of this section was at least five thousand dollars but less than twenty-five
thousand dollars; at least twenty-five thousand dollars but less than one hundred thou-
sand dollars; at least one hundred thousand dollars but less than five hundred thousand
dollars or over five hundred thousand dollars.
(c) Indicate if the total value of each investment and real property interest identified
pursuant to paragraph four of this section and each beneficial interest identified pursuant
to paragraph five of this section was during the reporting period, at least twenty-five
thousand dollars but less than one hundred thousand dollars; at least one hundred thou-
sand dollars but less than five hundred thousand dollars or five hundred thousand dol-
lars or more.
Id § 1106-5.0(b).
A substantial portion of the information disclosed is already made available to the individual
government departments. Sevin, 551 F. Supp. at 931.
7. NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 1106-5.0 (1979).
8. Id. § 5.0(d).
Local Law 48 amends a previous financial disclosure law, Local Law I of 1974. In Hunter v.
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employee claims an exemption, the city Board of Ethics evaluates the
claim9 and determines whether to exempt the information concerned
from public disclosure.'
The district court found the filing provisions under review in Barry
constitutional." The court held, however, that the public disclosure
provisions, which permit members of the public to inspect the files
upon request, violated the plaintiffs' right to privacy. 2 The Second
Circuit affirmed the district court's holding on the filing requirement,
reversed its holding on the public disclosure provision, and held: The
city's interest in identifying conflicts of interest justified the public dis-
closure provision of the ordinance.' 3 Furthermore, according to the
court, the existence of a privacy claim provision mitigated any infringe-
ment of the plaintiffs' right to privacy.' 4
Although the United States Constitution does not expressly safe-
guard a right of privacy,' 5 the Supreme Court has construed several
provisions of the Constitution to protect privacy. Usually privacy in-
terests that are corollaries of an interest protected by a specific constitu-
tional amendment receive constitutional protection.' 6  These
City of New York, 58 A.D.2d 136, 396 N.Y.S.2d 186 (1977), the court found that Local Law I
denied public employees due process because it failed to provide a mechanism for employees to
file a privacy claim. Local Law 48 is intended to satisfy this requirement.
9. NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 1106-5.0(d)d(l). The privacy claim
must be made in writing, and it must state the reasons why the information to be exempted is
considered private. Id. § 5.0(d)(3). Evaluation of privacy claims only occurs when a member of
the public requests access to the files.
10. Id at d(2). The ordinance establishes three factors which the Board of Ethics must con-
sider in evaluating privacy claims. The Board must consider whether the material to be exempted
is of a "highly personal nature," whether the material involves an "actual or potential conflict of
interest," and whether the material "in any way relates to the duties of the position held by the
filer." Id. See infra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
11. Slevin v. City of New York, 551 F. Supp. at 931.
12. Id at 937-38.
13. Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d at 1560-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
14. Id. at 1561.
15. Tort law protects the right to privacy from undue intrusion by private entities. See RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B-E (1977). See generally, Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L.
REV. 383 (1960) (treating developments in the common law tort concept of privacy); Warren &
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890) (the original discourse from which
developed most of the current tort law concerning privacy).
16. The Supreme Court has interpreted the first, third, fourth, and fifth amendments to pro-
tect privacy within specific contexts. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (first
amendment protection of freedom of speech and association safeguards right of the individual to
read an obscene book within the privacy of his home); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 n.5
(1967) (third amendment prohibition against unconsented peacetime quartering of a soldier in
Number 2]
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provisions, however, do not afford a general right of privacy.' 7
The Supreme Court does recognize a more general right of privacy
emanating from the substantive due process concept of personal lib-
erty."8 This general right of privacy encompasses both an individual's
one's home protects the privacy and sanctity of one's home); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 646
(1961) (fourth amendment applies to protect individuals from invasion of the privacy of the
home); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (privacy of association may be a necessary
incident to protection of the first amendment right to freedom of association); United States v.
Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452,464 (1932) (fourth amendment prohibition of unreasonable searches is to
be "liberally construed to safeguard the right of privacy"); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
630 (1886) (principles underlying the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination encom-
pass invasion of "the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life").
Further, some justices have interpreted the ninth amendment as providing a source of funda-
mental interests which, though not enumerated in the Constitution, are nonetheless safeguarded.
See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965); i. at 487-91 (Goldberg, J., concur-
ring). See also Redlich, Are There Certain Rights Retained by the People?, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 787
(1962) (construing the ninth amendment as a source of protection for unenumerated fundamental
rights).
For an argument that courts should not append privacy to the interests safeguarded by these
constitutional provisions, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 509 (Black, J., dissenting) (sub-
stituting broad language which is susceptible to a variety of definitions for words explicitly pro-
vided in the Constitution is likely to result in dilution of constitutionally created rights).
The historical progression of the law of privacy made this type of argument unnecessary in
Barry. The Barry court did not find it necessary to reexamine the basis for a constitutionally
protected privacy right in light of current judicial acceptance of the principle. See infra notes 73-
75 and accompanying text.
17. In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967), the Supreme Court stated that "[tihe
fourth amendment cannot be translated into a general right of privacy. . . . [I]t protects individ-
ual privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusions. . ." The Court arrived at a similar
conclusion with respect to the fifth amendment in United States v. Nobels, 422 U.S. 225, 233-34
(1975).
18. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Griswold the Supreme Court struck
down a Connecticut statute that banned the use of contraceptives by married persons. Justice
Douglas, writing for the majority, held that the Connecticut statute violated a right of privacy
derived from the penumbra formed by emanations from the specific guarantees of the Bill of
Rights. Id at 484-85. Although able to agree that the right of privacy exists, the majority dis-
agreed concerning the source of that right. Consequently the justices filed six separate opinions.
Justice Harlan found support for the existence of a right of privacy in "the basic values implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty." Id at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Goldberg read the
ninth amendment as a source of constitutionally protectible fundamental rights even though no
enumeration of such rights appears in the Constitution. The right to privacy is one such pro-
tectible right. Id at 491-92 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Justice White based his concurrence on
the argument that the Connecticut statute deprived plaintiffs of their liberty to use contraceptives
without due process of law, carefully avoiding any discussion of privacy. Id at 502 (White, J.,
concurring).
Justices Black and Stewart filed separate dissenting opinions. They both concluded that the
Constitution does not protect a general right of privacy, and therefore the Connecticut statute,
however unwise, was not unconstitutional. Id. at 507 (Black, J., dissenting), 530 (Stewart, J., dis-
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interest in making decisions free from government intrusion 9 and an
individual's interest in maintaining the confidentiality of personal in-
formation.2°  The Court has confined the scope of the autonomy
branch of privacy to familial concerns. 21 The scope of the confidential-
ity branch, however, remains unclear. 2
aenting). See generaly Griswold, The Right to Be Let Alone, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 216 (1960) (advo-
cating a broad view of privacy right); cf. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v.
Wade, 82 YALE LJ. 920, 930 (1973) (reads Griswold as finding a right to privacy only within the
narrow range of marital relations).
Eight years after Griswold, the Supreme Court held in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) that
"the fourteenth amendment's concept of liberty" was the source of a zone of privacy sufficiently
broad to accommodate a woman's right to choose whether to terminate her pregnancy. Id. at 153.
See also Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712-13 (1976) (citing Roe as authority for the existence of a
constitutional right of privacy); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65 (1973) (recogniz-
ing the right to privacy as a fundamental personal right guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment).
19. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 n.24 (1977). This concept is referred to as the privacy
interest's autonomy branch.
20. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977). The majority of courts evaluating disclo-
sure statutes cite Whalen as evidence of Supreme Court recognition of a protectible privacy inter-
est in nondisclosure of personal information. See infra note 44. A minority of courts maintain,
however, that Whalen does not establish a confidentiality branch of privacy. See e.g., J.P. v.
Desanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1088-89 (6th Cir. 1981) (any discussion of a confidentiality branch of
privacy in Whalen is dicta). A concurring opinion filed in Whalen supports this conclusion. Jus-
tice Stewart wrote a separate opinion to point out that he does not believe that the Constitution
protects any general right of privacy, and that the decision in Griswold cannot be interpreted to
protect an interest in nondisclosure of private information. 429 U.S. at 608-09 (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
21. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976) (the autonomy branch extends to matters
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships and child rearing and educa-
tion). See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (right of privacy extends to activities
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing); Paris
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65-66 (1973) (fundamental rights of privacy protect the
personal intimacies of the home, the family, motherhood, procreation, and child rearing).
Because the Supreme Court defines these familial decisions as fundamental interests, govern-
mental actions which impinge upon them will be subject to a high level of scrutiny. See e.g., Paul
v. Davis, 424 U.S. at 712-13 (there are limitations on the state's power to impinge fundamental
interests); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 155 (where fundamental interests are involved, impinging
regulations must further a compelling state interest); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 485
(governmental actions which impinge fundamental interests must be narrowly drawn to effectuate
their purpose).
Some analysts criticize this narrow construction of the scope of autonomy branch of privacy.
See, e.g., Eichbaum, Towards an Autonomy-Based Theory of Constitutional Privacy: Beyond the
Ideology of Familial Privacy, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 361 (1979) (advocating an autonomy-
based right of privacy which exceeds the scope of mere familial interests).
22. Courts have used the constitutional right to confidentiality in various situations in order
to find protectible privacy interests. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (distri-
bution of pornographic materials using children as subject matter violated the child's privacy
Washington University Open Scholarship
342 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 62:337
In Whalen v. Roe,23 a class consisting of patients and doctors charged
that New York State's Controlled Substances Act, 24 which requires dis-
closure of the names and addresses of persons obtaining certain pre-
scription drugs, 25 violated their privacy interests.26 The Supreme Court
determined that the challengers failed to demonstrate that the Act
posed a significant threat to their right of privacy.27 In reaching its
conclusion that the Act intruded minimally on the plaintiffs' privacy,
the Whalen Court focused on the Act's safeguards against public disclo-
sure of the collected information,28 and on the limited number of New
York Health Department employees who had access to the information
in question.29 In addition the Court noted that the plaintiffs did not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy because disclosure of medical
information is frequently necessary when obtaining medical care.30 Fi-
nally, the Court found that the Act represented a reasonable attempt by
the legislature to effectuate the legitimate purpose of inhibiting the di-
version of harmful drugs into unlawful channels.3 1 In light of the nu-
merous justifications for the required disclosures, the Whalen Court
interest); Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977) (recognizing a confidentiality
interest in nondisclosure of personal records and fies); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (pa-
tient's interest in avoiding disclosure of personal medical information is within the confidentiality
branch of privacy); Plante v. Gonzales, 575 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1978) (disclosure of personal fi-
nances implicates confidentiality interest).
23. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
24. New York State Controlled Substances Act of 1972, N.Y. PUBL. HEALTH LAW § 3300
(McKinney, Supp. 1976-77) [hereinafter referred to as the Act].
25. Id. The New York legislature classified drugs into several schedules according to the
drugs' potential for abuse and the extent of legal medical use of these drugs. The Schedule II
classification, which includes the drugs these plaintiffs used or prescribed, consisted of drugs
which have a high potential for abuse, but which may be prescribed for medical purposes.
26. 429 U.S. at 600. Plaintiffs contended that the Act violated both their autonomy and con-
fidentiality interests. Their autonomy argument was premised on the concern that potential users
of Schedule II drugs who became aware of the reporting requirement would be reluctant to accept
needed medical treatment. As a result, plaintiffs argued, the Act impaired their interest in making
important decisions regarding health care. The Court found this argument unpersuasive, id., and
concluded that the Act posed no significant threat to the plaintiffs' autonomy interests.
27. Id. at 603.
28. Id at 594. The Act expressly prohibits public disclosure of the collected information.
Health Department employees store the prescription forms in a vault and destroy them after five
years. Computer tapes remain in a locked cabinet and when employees use the tapes, they run the
computer "offline" to prevent tapping in. Finally, violation of the precautionary measures consti-
tutes a criminal offense. Id at 594-95.
29. Id at 595.
30. Id at 602.
31. Id at 597-98. The facts show that abuses, such as pharmacists reusing prescriptions in
order to dispense Schedule II drugs illegally, abounded. The legislature enacted the New York
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol62/iss2/8
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found it unnecessary to determine the level of scrutiny courts should
apply when disclosure requirements threaten confidentiality interests.32
Nevertheless, the Court's analysis foreshadowed the development of
the balancing test the Court announced in Nixon v. Administrator of
General Services.3
3
In Nixon, former president Richard M. Nixon challenged the consti-
tutionality of the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation
Act,34 which placed custody of the Nixon tapes in the director of the
General Services Administration .3  The Supreme Court conceded that
Nixon had a privacy interest in preserving his personal records from
public disclosure.36 The Court, however, balanced that interest against
the federal government's interest in preserving materials relating to
Nixon's term in office. 37 The balance favored the public interest. Con-
sequently, the Court held the Preservation Act constitutional.3 ,
Several factors led the Court to conclude that the intrusion on
Nixon's privacy would be minimal. First, the Court maintained that,
"having placed himself in the public spotlight," Nixon had a lower ex-
pectation of privacy in his affairs than someone who had not entered
public life.3 9 In addition, the Court noted that only a limited number
of professional archivists would view the fies,40 that the director would
return all personal materials to Nixon, and finally that the ratio of pri-
State Controlled Substances Act after detailed study of the abuses and consultation with other
states using similar acts to meet their drug enforcement problems. Id. at 591-92.
32, Id. at 602. In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan stated that, if it had implicated a
confidentiality interest, the Act would "presumably be justified only by compelling state interests."
Id at 606. The strict scrutiny suggested by use of the term "compelling state interests," however,
has not materialized as the applicable standard in confidentiality cases. See infra notes 44-46 and
accompanying text. Thus confidentiality cases are subject to a less rigid level of scrutiny than
autonomy cases. See supra note 21.
33. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
34. 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (1982) [hereinafter referred to as the Preservation Act].
35, 433 U.S. at 425.
36. Id at 457, The Court specifically noted that status alone does not negate all privacy
interests of public officials. Id.
37. Id. The Court recognized several valid legislative purposes for the Preservation Act.
First, it provided a means for preservation of executive papers for historical and educational pur-
poses. Second, making these materials available for review enabled an airing of the factors which
led to Nixon's resignation and thus, might facilitate rebirth of public confidence in the honesty of
government officials. Finally, Congress had a legitimate interest in making the materials available
to shed light on judicial proceedings then underway against Nixon. Id at 452-54.
38. Id. at 465.
39. Id. at 455.
40. Id at 465.
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vate to nonprivate materials contained in the files was quite low. 41 The
Court also found that substantial public interests demanded the disclo-
sure of the nonprivate materials contained in the files 42 and there were
no reasonable alternative means by which the government would ex-
tract from the commingled materials those in which it had a legitimate
interest.43
The majority of courts addressing claims of constitutionally pro-
tected confidentiality have adopted the Nixon balancing standard. 4  In
effect, these courts adopted an intermediate level of scrutiny, character-
ized as "something more than mere rationality," 45 that will adequately
screen disclosure laws so as to prevent their widespread application to
"anyone in any situation. '46
The proliferation of financial disclosure statutes applicable to all
levels of government,47 which commentators attribute in part to the
post-Watergate political climate,4 engendered considerable litigation
41. Id
42. Id at 452-54; see supra note 37.
43. 433 U.S. at 465.
44. See, e.g., United States v. Westinghouse Elec., 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir. 1980); Marti-
nelli v. District Court for Denver, Colo., 199 Colo. 163, 612 P.2d 1083, 1091 (1980); Goldtrap v.
Askew, 344 So.2d 20, 22 (Fla. 1976); Illinois State Employees Ass'n v. Walker, 57 III. 2d 512, 526,
315 N.E.2d 9, 17 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1058 (1974); Montgomery County v. Walsh, 274
Md. 502, 512, 336 A.2d 97, 105 (1975), appeal dismissed, 424 U.S. 901 (1976); Lehrhaupt v. Flynn,
140 N.J. Super. 250, 261, 356 A.2d 3542 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976), a ff'd, 75 N.J. 459 (1978);
Evans v. Carey, 40 N.Y.2d 1008, 1010, 359 N.E.2d 983, 983, 391 N.Y.S.2d 393, 393-94 (1976); Fritz
v. Gorton, 83 Wash. 2d 275, 294, 517 P.2d 911, 922 (1974), appeal dismissed, 417 U.S. 902 (1974).
In United States v. Westinghouse Elec., 638 F.2d 570, 578, (3rd Cir. 1980), the court scrutinized
the confidentiality claim involved by considering the following: the type of record requested, the
information it does or might contain, the potential for harm in any subsequent nonconsensual
disclosure, the injury from disclosure to the relationship which generated the record, the adequacy
of the safeguards to prevent nonconsensual disclosure, the degree of need for access, and the
state's interest in disclosure. Similarly, when evaluating the confidentiality claim in Martinelli v.
District Court for Denver, Colo., 199 Colo. 163, 612 P.2d 1083, (Colo. 1980), the Supreme Court
of Colorado followed a three-prong balancing test weighing the plaintiff's legitimate expectation
of privacy, the importance of the state's interest in disclosure, and the possibility that less intrusive
means of disclosure existed. Id at 174-75, 612 P.2d at 1091.
45. Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1134 (5th Cir. 1978).
46. Id But see Comment, Privacy Limits on Financial Disclosure Laws: Pruning Plante v.
Gonzales, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 601 (1979) (advocating heightened scrutiny for both autonomy and
confidentiality interests).
47. For a comprehensive compilation of state statutes, see Comment, supra note 46, at 601
n.l.
48. See, e.g., Note, Fighting Conflicts of Interest in Offcialdnr" Constitutional and Practical
Guidelinesfor State Financial Disclosure Laws, 73 MICH. L. REv. 758 (1975).
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concerning the constitutionality of such statutes.49 Much of this litiga-
tion focused on the constitutionality of financial disclosure statutes as
applied to certain categories of government officials and employees.5 °
In Plante v. Gonzalez,5 Florida state senators challenged the consti-
tutionality of the state's financial disclosure law on grounds that it vio-
lated their right to privacy.52 The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that the
senators had a valid confidentiality interest in avoiding disclosure of
their personal finances,5 3 but nonetheless joined the majority view find-
ing mandatory financial disclosure for elected public officials constitu-
tional.5 4 Echoing the language in Whalen and Nixon,55 the court found
that the senators, as elected public officials, had a low expectation of
privacy in their personal affairs.56 The court then balanced the plain-
tiffs' right to privacy against the state's concern in avoiding conflicts of
interest among its officials and the public's legitimate interest in the
financial affairs of their elected officials, and concluded that the statute
was constitutional. 57
Subsequently in Duplantier v. United States 8 the Fifth Circuit, in
upholding the validity of the Judicial Ethics Act, expanded the catego-
ries of persons to whom financial disclosure laws may constitutionally
apply to include non-elected federal judges.59 According to the court,
because the judges chose to accept public office, they have a limited
49. See, e.g., Goldtrap v. Askew, 334 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1976) (county ordinance requiring fi-
nancial disclosure from elected officials held constitutional); Illinois State Employees Ass'n v.
Walker, 57 Ill. 2d 512, 315 N.E.2d 9 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1058 (1974) (state employees'
challenge constitutionality of executive order requiring financial disclosure); Montgomery County
v. Walsh, 274 Md. 502, 336 A.2d 97 (1975), appeal disraissed 424 U.S. 901 (1976) (action challeng-
ing the constitutionality of county financial disclosure ordinance targeting elected and appointed
officials); Lehrhaupt v. Flynn, 140 NJ. Super. 250, 356 A.2d 3542 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976)
(municipal ordinance requiring financial disclosure by designated officials held constitutional);
Evans v. Carey, 40 N.Y.2d 1008, 359 N.E.2d 983, 391 N.Y.S.2d 393 (1976) (court upheld constitu-
tionality of executive order requiring disclosure by state officials); Fritz v. Gorton, 83 Wash. 2d
275, 517 P.2d 911 (1974), appeal dsmiwred, 417 U.S. 902 (1974) (action seeking declaration that
state disclosure law was unconstitutional).
50. See cases cited supra note 49.
51. 575 F.2d 1119 (1978).
52. Id at 1121-22.
53. Id at 1132.
54. Id. at 1136.
55. See supra notes 30, 39 and accompanying texts.
56. 575 F.2d at 1135.
57. Id at 1138.
58. 606 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1979).
59. Id. at 669.
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reasonable expectation of privacy, which is not altered by their status
as non-elected officers.6
Few cases specifically address the constitutionality of financial dis-
closure statutes aimed at low echelon public employees. In O'Brien v.
DiGrazia,61 the First Circuit held that a police commissioner question-
naire that required Boston police officers to disclose personal financial
information was constitutional.62  In this pre-W alen v. Roe decision,
whether an interest in nondisclosure of personal information com-
manded constitutional protection remained uncertain. 63 The court de-
cided to uphold the questionnaire substantially because the disclosed
information would not become publicf'
In Michigan Supreme Court lAdvisory Opinion of Constitutionality of
1975 P4 227,65 the court explicitly discussed the effect that the status of
the employee has on the allowable breadth of public employees finan-
cial disclosure statutes. The court considered the constitutionality of
the state's financial disclosure law, which applied to both low echelon
public employees and elected officials.66 The court concluded that mi-
nor public officials performing "ministerial and routine functions" may
not be compelled to disclose the same detailed information as higher
echelon employees.67 Other courts have indicated support for this con-
60. Id at 670.
61. 544 F.2d 543 (1st Cir. 1976).
62. Id at 546. The questionnaire required the plaintiffs to disclose all sources of income for
themselves and their spouses, all assets, and an estimate of their expenditures. The questionnaire
also required the plaintiffs to attach copies of their state and federal income tax forms. Id at 545.
63. Id at 546. The court noted that there is constitutional protection for privacy within the
context of specific constitutional provisions, but was uncertain about the existence of a more gen-
eral protection for the confidentiality interest. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
64. 544 F.2d at 546. The court found the police commissioner's suspicion of corruption
among the officers relevant to a consideration of the necessity of the questionnaire. Nevertheless,
the court held that the district court erred by considering the allegations of a connection to organ-
ized crime because the defendants did not allege that information in their complaints. Id at 545.
65. 396 Mich. 465, 242 N.W.2d 3 (1976). Advisory opinions are not binding on the court.
66. Id at 502-09, 242 N.W.2d at 18-21.
67. Id at 506, 242 N.W.2d at 20. But see Gideon v. Alabama State Ethics Comm'n, 379
So.2d 570 (Ala. 1980). In Gideon, the Alabama Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
state's Ethics in Government Act, which requires public employees earning in excess of $15,000
annually to file financial disclosure statements. The Gideon court, however, failed to recognize the
confidentiality branch of privacy the Supreme Court set forth in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589,
599-600 (1977), see supra notes 23-32 and accompanying text, and therefore based its conclusion
solely on its finding that financial privacy was not an interest recognizable under the "familial"
branch of privacy. A dissenting opinion in Gideon maintained that "the [i]nterest of the citzen in
maintaining the privacy of their finances compels that a distinction be drawn between public
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol62/iss2/8
Number 21 FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE
clusion in dicta.68
In Barry v. City of New York,69 the Second Circuit treated low eche-
lon employee status as material only in relation to whether that status
affects the likelihood of corruption or conflicts of interest. 0 The court
determined that low echelon employees are not immune from corrup-
tion,7 and therefore found no reason to differentiate among classes of
employees.72
As in earlier cases, the court acknowledged the existence of a privacy
interest in nondisclosure of personal financial information,7 3  and
adopted the intermediate scrutiny balancing test as the appropriate
standard of review.74 The court then affirmed the district court's hold-
ing that the government's legitimate interest in detecting and prevent-
ing conflict of interest outweighs the impact of the filing requirement
on plaintiffs' right to privacy. 75
The public disclosure provision of Local Law 48 presented the court
employees at large and public employees who hold positions of authority." 379 So.2d at 578
(Jones, J., dissenting).
68. See, e.g., Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1978). After stating its conclusion
that courts must apply a standard higher than minimum rationality to prevent widespread appli-
cation to any employee, the Plante court specifically noted that the two cases in which a court
invalidated financial disclosure statutes involved lower echelon employees. Id. at 1134 n.25 (citing
City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young, 2 Cal. 3d 259, 466 P.2d 225, 85 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1980) (financial
disclosure statute overly broad because it failed to differentiate among classes of employees); Ad-
visory Opinion 1975 PA 227, 396 Mich. 465, 242 N.W.2d 3 (1976) (lower echelon employees per-
forming nonmanagerial functions should not have to disclose the same detailed financial
information as upper echelon employees)); see also Gideon v. Alabama State Ethics Comm'n, 379
So.2d 570 (Ala. 1980) (Jones, J., dissenting) (lower level public employees have a higher reason-
able expectation of privacy in their finances).
69. 712 F.2d 1554 (2d Cir. 1983).
70. Id. at 1563.
71. Id.
72. Id The court found the distinction between non-policy making and policy making offi-
cials inconclusive. Id at 1560 n.6.
73. Id at 1559. The court expressed uncertainty regarding the scope of the interest protected,
but stated that privacy of personal matters is a protected interest. Id.
74. Id. at 1559. Adoption of this intermediate standard reflects the Supreme Court's reluc-
tance to expand the category of new fundamental interests commanding strict scrutiny review. Id.
See also Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1134 (5th Cir. 1978).
75. Id. at 1560. In reaching this conclusion the court disposed of several arguments which
plaintiffs presented in support of their claim that the filing mechanism was unconstitutional. First,
plaintiffs argued that the information which employees must file is already available to the city
through the individual departments employing the plaintiffs. Id The court stated, however, that
the city could establish its own central information system and need not rely on scattered depart-
mental records. The court also rejected plaintiffs' argument that Local Law 48 fails to provide
adequate safeguards to prevent disclosure. The court stated that the city has a long history of
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with a more difficult problem. The court conceded that public disclo-
sure of personal data represents a significantly greater intrusion on an
individual's privacy than mere filing.76 Concomitantly, the city has a
weaker interest in public disclosure than it does in the filing provi-
sions.7 7 Nonetheless, the court reasoned that the provision for disclo-
sure exemptions78 would function to delete all sensitive information
from the files. As a result, the information remaining accessible to the
public would not be highly personal, and would relate to the filer's job
or to a potential conflict of interest.79 Thus, the court concluded that
the privacy exemption mechanism adequately protects plaintiffs' rea-
sonable expectation of privacy, 0 and the ordinance therefore withstood
constitutional scrutiny.8 1
The Barry court correctly upheld the constitutionality of the filing
requirement of Local Law 48. Disclosure of information already avail-
able to other government departments, 2 which will be kept in confi-
dential files, 3 entails minimal intrusion on personal privacy. As a
result, the government's interest in monitoring the conduct of public
officials outweighs privacy concerns.
The court falters, however, in its analysis of the public disclosure
provisions of the ordinance.8 4 By considering an employee's status
only in relation to the likelihood of conflicts of interest, the court disre-
gards the apparent connection between status and reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy.85  Elected officials and high level appointees may
competently handling confidential files, and that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that officials
would afford these files less competent treatment. Id at 1561.
76. Id at 1561.
77. Id
78. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
79. 712 F.2d at 1561-62.
80. Id at 1562. The court reasoned that plaintiffs' reasonable expectation of privacy exists
only with respect to highly personal information not relating to their jobs. Id
81. Id at 1564. In responding to the plaintiffs' contention that the privacy mechanism inade-
quately protects their interests, the court noted that other courts have upheld the constitutionality
of disclosure statutes with even weaker privacy mechanisms. Id at 1563.
82. Slevin v. City of New York, 551 F. Supp. 917, 931 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). See supra note 8.
83. See supra note 75.
84. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
85. Many decisions dealing with the constitutionality of public employee financial disclosure
statutes focus on the level of employment in order to determine the filer's expectation of privacy.
The Supreme Court recognizes public status as a primary determinant of reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 455 (1977). Lower
courts also subscribe to the public status standard for determining reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy. See, e.g., Lehrhaupt v. Flynn, 140 NJ. Super. 250, 261, 356 A.2d 3542 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
[Vol. 62:337
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol62/iss2/8
Number 21 FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE
reasonably anticipate more public scrutiny of their private affairs than
public employees in less prominent offices.86 In addition, the public's
interest in disclosure is an expansive justification for intrusion that
threatens to swallow the confidentiality interest unless countered by
consideration of a reasonable expectation of privacy. 7 Reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy must, therefore, be a key element in the intermedi-
ate balancing test.8"
The court's analysis is also flawed because it places considerable em-
phasis on the privacy exemption mechanism for protection of plaintiff's
privacy,89 even though the ordinance leaves the scope of protection to
be given confidentiality claims to the discretion of the Board of Eth-
ics.90 The ordinance provides that the Board shall exempt material
which is "highly personal," which does not "relate in any way" to the
claimant's job, nor involve "an actual or potential conflict of inter-
est."91 These vague standards contrast sharply with the definitive safe-
guards the Supreme Court approved in Whalen v. Roe,92 and seem an
inadequate means of protecting plaintiffs' legitimate expectation of
privacy.
93
The protection afforded by the privacy mechanism is further dimin-
ished by the ordinance's requirement that privacy claims specify the
Div. 1976) (by accepting public employment, officials move toward status of a public citizen and
must subordinate privacy to the public's right to know); Fritz v. Gorton, 83 Wash. 2d 275, 294, 517
P.2d 911,923 (1974) (candidates or public officers who enter the limelight invite greater scrutiny of
their private lives); In re Kading, 70 Wis. 2d 508, 526, 235 N.W.2d 409, 417 (1975) (those who
willingly place themselves in the public arena are subject to reasonable scrutiny and exposure).
86. See supra note 85. The public's right to know counters the public employee's right to
privacy. See Fritz v. Gorton, 83 Wash. 2d 275, 298, 517 P.2d 911, 925 (1974) (the public's right to
know is no less fundamental than the official's right to privacy). The balance of these two interests
weighs most strongly in favor of the public's right to know when the official occupies an elective
office or a high policy-making position. In such cases, the requirements of an informed voting
public and protection of the public trust strongly favor disclosure of information that may indicate
possible conflicts of interest. See Note, The Constitutionality of Financial Disclosure Laws, 59 CoR-
NELL L. REv. 345, 354 (1974).
87. Slevin v. City of New York, 551 F. Supp. at 938. The public's right to know extends well
beyond the disclosures necessary to create an informed voting public. If carried to its extreme, the
public's right to know would justify disclosure by all persons connected with the government.
88. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
90. NEw YORK Criy, N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 1106-5.0(3) (1979). The ordinance
provides that the Board of Ethics shall establish procedures for consideration of the requests for
exemption.
91. See supra notes 9-10.
92. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
93. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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reasons for considering the information private.94 The reasons are po-
tentially more sensitive than the filed information.95 Moreover, under
the ordinance consideration of privacy only occurs upon a request for
access. 96 As a result, the filer is forced to disclose private information,
and then to wait indefinitely without knowing whether the Board will
uphold the privacy claim. The resultant anxiety seems an added bur-
den to an innocent employee.
Finally, the Barry court's reliance on Duplantier v. United States?7 as
an example of the constitutionality of financial disclosure statutes with
less stringent safeguards than those provided in Local Law 4891 does
not quiet the concern regarding the adequacy of these safeguards. The
Duplantier plaintiffs were federal judges who, as public figures, had
minimal reasonable expectation of privacy.99 Consequently, the Judi-
cial Ethics Act intruded on their privacy significantly less than does a
similar act applied to lower echelon employees.
The central issue in Barry is the extent to which the government may
legitimately intrude on employees' confidentiality interest.100 Proper
resolution of this issue requires the court to effect a delicate balance
between the public's right to know and the employee's right to pri-
vacy. °10 The Barry decision expands the extent to which the govern-
ment may impinge on the privacy right of its employees by placing
unwarranted confidence in the privacy mechanism while failing to con-
sider reasonable expectation of privacy. Only a clear Supreme Court
directive defining the scope of the privacy interest's confidentiality
branch will prevent other errant decisions regarding public information
disclosure statutes.
-, S.O0.T
94. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
95. In Slevin v. City of New York, 551 F. Supp. at 936, the district court notes that a person
losing the privacy claim must disclose the private material as well as the privately held reasons
that the material is private.
96. See supra note 9.
97. 606 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1979). See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
98. 712 F.2d at 1563. See supra note 81.
99. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
100. This issue has produced considerable litigation. See supra note 49.
101. See supra notes 85-86.
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